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1 Introduction
We consider the situation that n players have to divide a cake of size S.
At time 0 player i has the initial right to receive the amount αi, where it
is assumed that
 
i∈N αi < S. If player i claims his part at time t > 0
then he receives the discounted part δtαi of the cake, unless he is the last




Cake sharing games are examples of games of timing, ﬁrst analyzed
by S.Karlin (1959) in the zero sum context. Other examples of games of
timing can be found in Baston and Garnaev (2000) and Laraki et al. (2003).
Hamers (1993) showed that 2-person cake sharing games always admit a
unique Nash equilibrium.
In this paper we consider cake sharing games that are slightly diﬀerent
from the games introduced in Hamers (1993). We will ﬁrst provide an al-
ternative, but more direct, existence and uniqueness result for 2-player cake
sharing games and we will generalize this result to cake sharing games with
more players.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we will introduce cake
sharing games. Sections 3 and 4 deal with 2-player cake sharing games and
more player cake sharing games respectively.
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12 The Model
In this section we formally introduce the cake sharing games.
Let N = {1,...,n} be a set of players with n ≥ 2, let S > 0, let
α = (α1,...,αn) ∈ RN
+ be such that α1 +     + αn < S and let δ ∈ (0,1).
Throughout this paper we assume that 0 < α1 < α2 <     < αn. The
number S is called the size of the cake, the vector α the initial right vector
and δ the discount factor.
The cake sharing game with pure strategies, associated with S, α and δ,
is the triple Γ
pure
S,α,δ =< N,{Ai}i∈N,{πi}i∈N >, where
• Ai = [0,∞) is the set of pure strategies of player i ∈ N,












So, if there is a unique last claimant this player will receive the discounted
value of the cake that remains after that the other players have taken their
initial rights. If there is not a unique last claimant all players receive the
discounted value of their initial rights. Note that the payoﬀ functions deﬁned
above diﬀer slightly from the payoﬀ functions introduced in Hamers (1993),
where, in case there is not a unique last claimant, the discounted value of
the remaining cake is shared equally between the last claimants.
One easily veriﬁes that Γ
pure
S,α,δ has no Nash equilibria: if there is a unique
last claimant this player can improve his payoﬀ by claiming a little bit earlier
(remaining the last claimant of course), if there is no unique last claimant
then one of the last claimants can improve his payoﬀ by claiming a little bit
later (becoming the unique last claimant in this way). So, for an appropriate
analysis of cake sharing games we need to consider mixed strategies.
Formally, a mixed strategy is a function G : [0,∞) → [0,1] satisfying:
• G(0) = 0,
• G is a nondecreasing function,
• G is left-continuous,
• limx→∞ G(x) = 1.







1See V.K.Rohatgi (1976) for more details.
2for all x ∈ [0,∞). On the other hand, every probability measure P on [0,∞)
deﬁnes by formula (1) a mixed strategy G. So the set of mixed strategies
coincides with the set of probability measures on [0,∞)2. Let G denote the
set of all mixed strategies. We introduce now some other notations related
to mixed strategy G:
• for x ∈ [0,∞) we denote limy↓x G(y), the probability of choosing an
element in the closed interval [0,x], by G(x+).
• if for an x > 0 it holds that for every a,b ∈ [0,∞) with a < x < b
we have G(b) > G(a+), i.e., the probability of choosing an element
in (a,b) is positive, then x is an element of the support of G. If for
every b > 0 it holds that G(b) > 0, i.e., the probability of choosing an
element in [0,b) is positive, then 0 is an element of the support of G.
The support of the distribution function G will be denoted by S(G).
One easily veriﬁes that S(G) is a closed set.
• the set of jumps (discontinuities) of G is J(G) := {x ∈ [0,∞) | G(x+) >
G(x)}, i.e., the set of pure strategies which are chosen with positive
probability.
If player i chooses pure strategy t and all other players choose mixed strate-





Gj(t)   δt   (S −
 
j =i
αj) + (1 −
 
j =i
Gj(t))   δt   αi







If player i also chooses a mixed strategy Gi, whereas all other players stick
to mixed strategies {Gj}j =i then the expected payoﬀ for player i can be




Note that, with a slight abuse of notation, the functions πi do not only de-
note payoﬀs to players when pure strategies are played, but also when mixed
strategies are used.
The cake sharing game, associated with S, α and δ, is the triple ΓS,α,δ =<
N,{Xi}i∈N,{πi}i∈N >, where
2An alternative way of deﬁning mixed strategies G is as a nondecreasing, right-
continuous function from [0,∞) to [0,1] with limx→∞ G(x) = 1. For such a function





x ∈ [0,∞), i.e., G is the (cumulative) distribution function corresponding to P. Although
this equivalent approach seems more natural, this would lead to technical problems when
computing Lebesgue-Stieltjes integrals later on.
3• Xi = G is the set of mixed strategies of player i ∈ N,
• πi, deﬁned by (2), is the (expected) payoﬀ function of player i ∈ N.
Given a strategy proﬁle G = (G1,G2,...,Gn) ∈ Gn, let πG
i (t) denote the
payoﬀ πi(G1,...,Gi−1,t,Gi+1,...,Gn). So πG
i (t) is the expected payoﬀ of
player i when he chooses the pure strategy t and all the other players act in
accordance with G.
3 Two Players
In this section we provide an alternative proof of the result of Hamers (1993)
for 2-player cake sharing games. Our incentives for doing this job are three-
fold. First of all we want to recall that our model is slightly diﬀerent from
the model of Hamers (1993), so a new proof is required. Secondly, our proof
is more direct than Hamers’ proof. Finally, our proof will form the basis for
the results in Section 4 for cake sharing games with three or more players.
First we derive a number of properties for Nash equilibria of n-player
cake sharing games. The following lemma shows that in a Nash equilibrium
players do not put positive probability on a pure strategy t > 0.
Lemma 1. Let ΓS,α,δ be an n-player cake sharing game and let the proﬁle
G = (Gi)i∈N ∈ GN be a Nash equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ. Then J(Gi)∩(0,∞) = ∅
for every i ∈ N.
Proof. Let i ∈ N. We will show that J(Gi) ∩ (0,∞) = ∅. Without loss of
generality we may assume that i = 1.
Suppose that u ∈ J(G1) ∩ (0,∞). If Gi(u+) = 0 for some i  = 1 then
πG
1 (t) = δtα1 whenever t ∈ [0,u]. Since the function πG
1 ( ) is strictly de-
creasing on [0,u], player 1 would be better oﬀ moving the probability in u
to 0. So Gi(u+) > 0 for all i ∈ N. Now consider the functions
πG







for i ∈ N\{1}. Since G1 is discontinuous at u, i.e., G1(u+) > G1(u), there
exist u1 < u, u2 > u and ε > 0 such that for every i  = 1
πG
i (u2) − πG
i (t) ≥ ε for every t ∈ [u1,u].
If player i ∈ N\{1} puts positive probability on [u1,u], i.e., if Gi(u+) >
Gi(u1), then he can increase his payoﬀ by at least ε(Gi(u+) − Gi(u1)) by
moving all this probability to u2. So for all i ∈ N\{1} we have Gi(u+) =
Gi(u1) and hence Gi(t) = Gi(u) for every t ∈ [u1,u]. Therefore the function
πG







4is strictly decreasing on [u1,u]. So player 1 can improve his payoﬀ by moving
some probability from u to u1.
Lemma 1 implies that in a Nash equilibrium G players use mixed strate-
gies which are continuous on (0,∞). Therefore we may write Gi(t+) = Gi(t)
for every i ∈ N and t > 0. Moreover, the functions πG
i ( ) are continuous on
(0,∞).
Lemma 2. Let ΓS,α,δ be an n-player cake sharing game and let the proﬁle
G = (Gi)i∈N ∈ GN be a Nash equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ. Let i ∈ N and t ∈ S(Gi).
There exists j ∈ N\{i} such that t ∈ S(Gj).
Proof. Suppose that t / ∈ ∪j =iS(Gj). We will distinguish between two cases:
Case (i): t > 0. There exist t1,t2 > 0 with t1 < t < t2 such that Gj(t2) =
Gj(t1) for all j  = i.3 Hence Gj(u) = Gj(t2) for every u ∈ [t1,t2] and every
j  = i. Therefore the function
πG







is strictly decreasing on [t1,t2]. Since t ∈ S(Gi) we have Gi(t2) > Gi(t+
1 ),
i.e., player i puts positive probability on (t1,t2). Now player i can strictly
improve his payoﬀ by moving all this probability to t1.
Case (ii): t = 0. Let b > 0 be the smallest element in ∪j =iS(Gj) (recall
that all the S(Gj) are closed). Clearly Gj(b) = 0 for all j  = i. Again,
if Gi(b) > Gi(0+), i.e., if player i puts positive probability on (0,b), then
similar arguments as in Case (i) can be used to show that player i can strictly
improve his payoﬀ by moving this probability to 0. So Gi(b) = Gi(0+) and
hence, since 0 ∈ S(Gi), we have Gi(0+) > 0. Moreover Gi(t) = Gi(b) for
every t ∈ (0,b] (this is relevant only for the case n = 2), so
πG







is strictly decreasing on (0,b] for every j ∈ N\{i}.
Let a ∈ (0,b) and let j ∈ N\{i} be a player such that b ∈ S(Gj). Clearly
ε := πG
j (a) − πG
j (b) > 0. Since the function πG
j ( ) is continuous on (0,∞)
we have, for δ > 0 suﬃciently small,
πG




ε for every t ∈ [b,b + δ].
Since b ∈ S(Gj) we have Gj(b+δ) > 0 = Gj(b). So, player j can improve his
payoﬀ by moving the probability he assigns to [b,b+δ) to a. Contradiction.




2 > 0 with t
j
1 < t < t
j





We therefore take t1 = maxj∈N\{i} t
j
1 and t2 = minj∈N\{i} t
j
2.
5The following lemma shows that if some pure strategy t does not belong
to the support of any of the equilibrium strategies, then no pure strategy
t′ > t belongs to the support of any of the equilibrium strategies either.
Lemma 3. Let G = (Gi)i∈N be a Nash equilibrium of the n-player cake
sharing game ΓS,α,δ. Suppose t ∈ [0,∞) is such that t / ∈ S(Gj) for every
j ∈ N. Then (t,∞) ∩ S(Gj) = ∅ for every j ∈ N.
Proof. Deﬁne K = ∪j∈NS(Gj). Clearly K is closed and t / ∈ K. We have to
show that K∩(t,∞) = ∅. Suppose that K∩(t,∞)  = ∅. Deﬁne t∗ = min{u ∈
K|u > t}. Let j∗ ∈ N be such that t∗ ∈ S(Gj∗). Because [t,t∗)∩S(Gj) = ∅
for every j ∈ N we have Gj(t) = Gj(t∗) for every j ∈ N. So the functions
Gj are constant on [t,t∗]. Since
πG







for every u ∈ [0,∞), the function πG
j∗( ) is strictly decreasing on [t,t∗]. By
continuity of πG
j∗( ) at t∗ we infer that πG
j∗(t) > πG
j∗(u) for every u ∈ [t∗,t∗+ε],
with ε > 0 suﬃciently small. Hence Gj∗ is constant on [t∗,t∗ + ε] as well,
contradicting the fact that t∗ ∈ S(Gj∗).
Now we provide speciﬁc results for 2-player cake sharing games. The fol-
lowing lemma shows that in a Nash equilibrium players use mixed strategies
of which the supports coincide.
Lemma 4. Let ΓS,α,δ be a 2-player cake sharing game and let (G1,G2) ∈
G × G be a Nash equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ. Then S(G1) = S(G2).
Proof. This result is just a consequence of Lemma 2.
In the following lemma we will show that the supports of the strategies
in a Nash equilibrium are compact intervals.
Lemma 5. Let ΓS,α,δ be a 2-player cake sharing game and let G = (G1,G2) ∈
G × G be a Nash equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ. Let k := logδ
α2
S−α1. Then S(G1) =
S(G2) = [0,k].
Proof. First we will show that S(G1) = S(G2) ⊆ [0,k]. For every t ∈ (k,∞)
we have
πG
2 (t) = δt(α2 + (S − α1 − α2)G1(t))
≤ δt(α2 + (S − α1 − α2))
= δt(S − α1)




6If G2(k) = G2(k+) < 1, i.e., if player 2 puts positive probability on (k,∞), he
can improve his payoﬀ strictly by moving all this probability to 0. Therefore
G2(k) = 1 and hence S(G1) = S(G2) ⊆ [0,k].
Let k∗ be the largest element in the closed set S(G1). Clearly k∗ ≤ k. If k∗ =
0 then (G1,G2) would be an equilibrium in pure strategies, a contradiction.
So k∗ > 0. According to Lemma 3 we have S(G1) = S(G2) = [0,k∗].
The only thing which remains to be shown is that k∗ = k. Suppose that
k∗ < k. For τ ∈ (0,k − k∗) we have
πG
1 (k∗ + τ) = δk∗+τ(α1 + (S − α1 − α2)G2(k∗ + τ))
= δk∗+τ(α1 + (S − α1 − α2))
= δk∗+τ(S − α2)







where at the weak inequality we used that α2(S − α2) ≥ α1(S − α1). So, if
G1(0+) > 0, i.e., if player 1 plays pure strategy 0 with positive probability,
then he can improve his payoﬀ by moving some probability from 0 to pure
strategy k∗ + τ. Therefore G1(0+) = 0. For some t ∈ (k∗,k) we have
πG
2 (t) = δt(α2 + (S − α1 − α2)G1(t))
= δt(α2 + (S − α1 − α2))
= δt(S − α1)




Since 0 ∈ S(G1) and πG
2 ( ) is continuous at 0 (due to G1(0+) = 0) player 2
can improve his payoﬀ strictly by moving some probability from the neigh-
borhood of 0 to t. Contradiction, so k∗ = k.
Now we are able to prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 1. Let ΓS,α,δ be a 2-player cake sharing game and k := logδ
α2
S−α1.
Deﬁne G∗ = (G∗
1,G∗







δt(S − α1 − α2)
if 0 ≤ t ≤ k






0 if t = 0
α2(S − α2) − α1(S − α1)δt
δt(S − α1)(S − α1 − α2)
if 0 < t ≤ k
1 if t > k















α1 if t = 0
α2(S − α2)
S − α1
if 0 < t ≤ k





α2 if 0 ≤ t ≤ k

















for every t ∈ [0,∞) we infer that G∗ is a Nash equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ.
In order to show that there are no other Nash equilibria let (G1,G2) be
a Nash equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ. According to Lemma 1 the strategies G1 and
G2 are continuous on (0,∞). In the same way as in the proof of Lemma 5
we can show that G1(0+) = 0. So, the function πG
1 ( ) is continuous on
(0,∞) and the function πG
2 ( ) is continuous on [0,∞). By Lemma 5 we have
S(G1) = S(G2) = [0,k]. So, there exist constants c and d such that
c = πG
1 (t) = δt(α1 + (S − α1 − α2)G2(t)) for every t ∈ (0,k]
d = πG
2 (t) = δt(α2 + (S − α1 − α2)G1(t)) for every t ∈ [0,k].
Since G1(0) = 0 we have d = πG
2 (0) = α2, from which we derive that
G1(t) =
α2 − α2δt
δt(S − α1 − α2)
= G∗
1(t)
for every t ∈ [0,k]. Clearly, G1(t) = 1 = G∗
1(t) for every t > k, so G1 = G∗
1.
Moreover, since G2(k) = 1 we have c = πG
1 (k) = δk(S − α2) =
α2(S−α2)
S−α1 ,
from which we derive that
G2(t) =
α2(S − α2) − α1(S − α1)δt
δt(S − α1)(S − α1 − α2)
= G∗
2(t)
for every t ∈ (0,k]. Clearly G2(0) = 0 = G∗
2(0) and G2(t) = 1 = G∗
2(t) for
every t > k, so G2 = G∗
2. This ﬁnishes the proof.
84 More players
In this section we consider cake sharing games with more than two players.
Again we will show that such games admit a unique Nash equilibrium.
First we show that mixed strategies in a Nash equilibrium have a bounded
support.
Lemma 6. Let ΓS,α,δ be an n-player cake sharing game with n ≥ 3 and let







Then k1 > k2 >     > kn and S(Gi) ⊂ [0,ki] for every i ∈ N. Moreover
S(G1) ⊂ [0,k2].




αi(S − γ − αi) − αj(S − γ − αj)
= αi(S − γ − αi) − αiαj + αiαj − αj(S − γ − αj)








S − γ − αj
αj
S − γ − αi
=
αi(S − γ − αi)
αj(S − γ − αj)
> 1 (3)
and hence ki < kj.
Now, for every i ∈ N and t ∈ (ki,∞)
πG

















Repeating the reasoning in Lemma 5, if Gi(ki) = Gi(k+
i ) < 1, then player
i can strictly improve his payoﬀ by moving all the probability in (ki,∞) to
0. Therefore Gi(ki) = 1 for all i ∈ N. For any j ∈ N\{1} we have k2 ≥ kj
and hence Gj(k2) ≥ Gj(kj) = 1. So Gj(k2) = 1 and hence S(Gj) ⊂ [0,k2].
Now, because of Lemma 2 we conclude that S(G1) ⊂ [0,k2] as well.
In the following lemma we show that pure strategy 0 belongs to the
support of every equilibrium strategy. Moreover, players 2,...,n play this
strategy with positive probability.
9Lemma 7. Let ΓS,α,δ be an n-player cake sharing game and let G = (Gi)i∈N ∈
GN be a Nash equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ. Then 0 ∈ S(Gj) for every j ∈ N. More-
over Gj(0+) > 0 for every j ∈ N\{1}.
Proof. Suppose 0 / ∈ S(Gi) for some i ∈ N. Let s > 0 be the smallest element
in the closed set S(Gi). Then [0,s) ∩ S(Gi) = ∅ and hence Gi(t) = 0 for
every t ∈ [0,s]. Consequently the function
πG







is strictly decreasing on [0,s] for every j ∈ N\{i}. Hence (0,s)∩S(Gj) = ∅
for every j ∈ N\{i}. Choose s∗ ∈ (0,s). Then s∗ / ∈ S(Gj) for every j ∈ N.
According to Lemma 3 we have (s∗,∞) ∩ S(Gi) = ∅, a contradiction with
s ∈ S(Gi). So, 0 ∈ S(Gj) for every j ∈ N.
Now suppose i ∈ N\{1} is such that Gi(0+) = 0. This implies that the
function
πG












. According to Lemma 6 we
have Gj(k2) = 1 for every j ∈ N. Hence
πG











αj) > α1 = πG
1 (0).
Due to continuity of πG
1 ( ) at 0 we have πG
1 (k2) > πG
1 (t) for every t ∈ [0,ε]
with ε > 0 suﬃciently small. So, [0,ε) ∩ S(G1) = ∅, contradicting the fact
that 0 ∈ S(G1).
The following lemma provides the equilibrium payoﬀs in a Nash equilib-
rium.
Lemma 8. Let G = (Gi)i∈N be a Nash equilibrium of the n-player cake










and ηj = αj for every j ∈ N\{1}.
Proof. According to Lemma 7 we have Gj(0+) > 0 for every j ∈ N\{1}.
Hence ηj = πG















10If η1 > πG
1 (k2) then, by the continuity of πG
1 ( ) at k2, we infer that for
γ > 0 suﬃciently small we have η1 > πG
1 (t) for every t ∈ [k2 − γ,k2]. Hence
S(G1) ⊆ [0,k2 − γ]. Now player 2 can obtain more than α2 by putting all
his probability at k2 − γ + ǫ for ǫ > 0 small enough.
In the following lemma we show that in a Nash equilibrium players
3,...,n claim their initial right immediately, i.e., they play pure strategy 0.
Lemma 9. Let G = (Gi)i∈N be a Nash equilibrium of the n-player cake
sharing game ΓS,α,δ with n ≥ 3. Then for every i ∈ N\{1,2} we have
Gi(t) =
 
0 if t = 0
1 if t > 0
i.e., Gi corresponds to pure strategy 0.
Proof. Let i ∈ N\{1,2} and suppose that it is not true that
Gi(t) =
 
0 if t = 0
1 if t > 0
Deﬁne t∗ = inf{t | Gi(t) = 1}. Note that t∗ > 0 and t∗ ∈ S(Gi). Moreover,
by continuity of Gi in t∗ we have Gi(t∗) = 1. Now we have
πG
2 (t∗) = δt∗






Gj(t∗)) ≤ α2, (4)
since otherwise player 2 could deviate to pure strategy t∗ obtaining strictly
more than his equilibrium payoﬀ α2. Moreover, due to t∗ ∈ S(Gi),
πG
i (t∗) = δt∗






Gj(t∗)) = αi, (5)

















Gj(t∗) = αi(1 − δt∗
).
According to Lemma 7 we have Gj(t∗) > 0 for every j ∈ N. So, dividing







which leads to the conclusion that G2(t∗) > Gi(t∗) = 1, a contradiction.
11As a consequence of the last result, the only possible Nash equilibrium
in a cake sharing game is one in which players 3,...,n play pure strategy 0
and players 1 and 2 play the game with total cake size S −
 n
i=3 αi.
Theorem 2. Let ΓS,α,δ be an n-player cake sharing game with n ≥ 3 and




j =2 αj. Deﬁne G∗ = (G∗










if 0 ≤ t ≤ k2




       
       
0 if t = 0
α2(S −
 








if 0 < t ≤ k2




0 if t = 0
1 if t > 0
for every i ∈ {3,...,n}. Then G∗ is the unique Nash equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ.
Proof. Suppose G = (Gi)i∈N ∈ GN is a Nash equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ. As
a consequence of Lemma 9 we have Gi = G∗
i for every i ∈ {3,...,n},
so players 3,...,n claim their initial rights immediately. Now (G1,G2) is
a Nash equilibrium of the 2-player cake sharing game with cake size S −  n
i=3 αi and initial right vector (α1,α2). According to Theorem 1 we have
G1 = G∗
1 and G2 = G∗
2. So G = G∗.
Now we show that G∗ is indeed a Nash equilibrium. Since, according
to Theorem 1, (G∗
1,G∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium of the 2-player cake sharing
game with cake size S −
 n
i=3 αi and initial right vector (α1,α2), players
1 and 2 can not gain by deviating unilaterally. Now we show that players
3,...,n are not interested in deviating either. For this it is suﬃcient to
show that πG∗
i (t) ≤ αi for every i ∈ {3,...,n} and every t ∈ [0,∞). So, let
i ∈ {3,...,n}. Then for every t ∈ [k2,∞) we have
πG∗























j =i αj and at the last inequality we used the fact that
ki < k2 (see Lemma 6). Hence it is suﬃcient to show that πG∗
i (t) ≤ αi for
every t ∈ [0,k2]. Note that for every t ∈ [0,k2] (also for t = 0!) we have
12πG∗














= δtαi + (α2 − α2δt)
α2(S −
 






































= aδt + bδ−t + c,
where































Making the change of variables x = δt note that it is suﬃcient to show that
for the function f : (0,∞) → I R, deﬁned by




we have f(x) ≤ αi for every x ∈ [δk2,1]. Since f′′(x) = 2b
x3 > 0 for every
x ∈ [δk2,1], the function f is convex on [δk2,1]. Consequently, f(x) ≤
max{f(δk2),f(1)}. Since f(1) = a + b + c = αi and f(δk2) = πG∗
i (k2) ≤ αi,
this ﬁnishes the proof.
Remark 1. Throughout this paper we assumed that α1 < α2 <     < αn.
Scrutinizing the proofs of Lemmas 1-5 and Theorem 1 we may conclude that
for 2-player cake sharing games the same result (existence and uniqueness
of a Nash equilibrium) also holds in case α1 = α2. For cake sharing games
with at least three players the existence result is still valid in the more general
case α1 ≤ α2 ≤     ≤ αn (and a Nash equilibrium is still provided by the
proﬁle described in Theorem 2). With few additional eﬀorts we can show
that this Nash equilibrium is unique if and only if α2 < α3.
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